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ICSID Annulment Committee Appointments: Too Much Discretion for the 
Chairman? 
 
by David Collins  
ABSTRACT: 
This article critically examines the system by which individuals are appointed to ICSID 
annulment committees.  It observes the largely unilateral and highly discretionary role of the 
ICSID Chairman in this process, urging greater participation in the selection of annulment 
committees by the member states of ICSID in order to improve the transparency and 
legitimacy in this crucial feature of ICSID dispute settlement. A procedure similar to that 
adopted with respect to the World Trade Organization’s Appellate Body may be instructive in 
this regard. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (‘ICSID’) is among the 
most widely used mechanisms for investor-state arbitration in the world, enjoying 
membership of 158 signatory states as of April 2013 and identified as an available forum for 
the resolution of disputes in many thousands of bilateral investment treaties adopted by 
developed and developing states alike.  Among the most controversial features of ICSID’s 
procedures is its annulment mechanism.  This feature of the dispute settlement process allows 
parties to challenge an award rendered by an ICSID tribunal on one or more very narrow 
grounds, essentially capturing procedural errors regarding the manner in which the award was 
adjudicated by the tribunal.  Most of the commentary on ICSID’s annulment procedure to 
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date has focussed on substantive assessments of the scope of the decisions of the ad hoc 
annulment committees, their coherence as a body of international investment jurisprudence 
and most notably, whether committees have adhered to their highly circumscribed role as 
reviewers of the grounds of potential illegitimacy of the tribunal’s decision-making process 
and not errors of law.1  While many of these assessments hold merit, this article will offer 
critical insight into the process by which the ad hoc annulment committees are constituted.  
This procedure is worthy of additional scrutiny because the manner in which annulment 
committees are selected is almost completely removed from the choice of the parties and has 
only indirect input from the member states of ICSID.  In a procedure that is largely 
undemocratic and certainly lacking in transparency, the choice of composition of the 
committees is placed at the unilateral discretion of the Chairman of ICSID subject to only a 
few narrow constraints.  This represents an unwelcome derogation of member (as well as 
party) autonomy over the arbitration process, undermining the fairness and indeed the 
legitimacy of a key aspect of ICSID’s dispute settlement procedure.  The article will 
accordingly recommend modifications to the annulment committee appointment procedure, 
contemplating a greater role for the member states.  This adjustment could augment the 
integrity of ICSID as an effective, member-driven forum for the settlement of investor-state 
disputes under international law.   
 
2.  THE ICSID ANNULMENT PROCEDURE 
                                                             
1
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The annulment procedure available under ICSID rules has endured much criticism by 
commentators but as noted above, it is not the purpose of this article to evaluate the 
legitimacy of these complaints or even to discuss them in detail.  Still, a few general 
observations regarding the perceived weaknesses of the annulment process is apposite 
because deficiencies in these substantive areas may be in part addressed by resolving the 
deficiencies in annulment process.  One of the principle attacks on the annulment procedure 
is that it is very limited, allowing for the extinguishing of awards in only a few, very narrow 
circumstances,2 a characteristic that reflects the status of annulment as an exceptional 
procedure in the ICSID dispute settlement process.  Among these narrow grounds as outlined 
in the ICSID Convention, the most common instigations of the annulment mechanism are 
when a party alleges that the tribunal manifestly exceeded its powers by investigating the 
substance of the award too comprehensively3 or that there has been a departure from a 
fundamental rule of procedure.4  The annulment procedure has been further derided for the 
lack of clarity with respect to the grounds of annulment as well as crucially, issuing 
inconsistent decisions.5 Annulment decisions have been further disparaged for including 
obiter statements that undermine the enforceability of decisions by pointing to mistakes in 
law but then failing to nullify them.6  It must be stressed that the ICSID annulment procedure 
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is not intended to be an appeal on the legal merits of the award issued by the ad hoc 
arbitration tribunals.  Decisions of annulment committees are just that – decisions and not 
awards.  They are, or at least should be, assessments of the validity of the award rendered by 
the tribunal, not of the dispute itself.    
Still, the above-noted weaknesses must be taken seriously because it is without 
question that ad hoc annulment committees do wield significant power.  They can render an 
award issued by an ICSID tribunal legally ineffectual; an award that is annulled is erased as if 
it was never rendered.  Furthermore, although ICSID does not operate under a system of 
precedent, it is widely acknowledged that there is an informal de facto system of precedent in 
operation, with arbitration tribunals as well as annulment committees generally attempting to 
as achieve some degree of consistency in their interpretation of legal principles, both 
substantively and procedurally.  As a self-contained dispute settlement procedure ICSID 
annulment committees, like ICSID tribunals, should accordingly work towards enhancing the 
predictability of outcomes and in so doing solidify the expectations of investors and host 
states. This is a remarkably important role given that the composition of the annulment 
committees is effectively beyond the control of the member states of ICSID as well as the 
parties, indeed the lack of party control itself represents a derogation from the party-driven 
focus of arbitration.  It is interesting to observe that investment arbitration websites now offer 
informal consolidation of annulment decisions by reference to the name of the individual 
annulment committee member.7  The implication is clear – investors are interested in 
identifying patterns in the decisions made by annulment members as this may imply 
predictive value in terms of future outcomes, even though the identity of the annulment 
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committee members are beyond their control.  This intensifies the need to ensure that the 
manner in which annulment committees are chosen is transparent and consistent. 
 
3.  THE COMPOSITION OF ANNULMENT COMMITTEES 
3.1   Selection of Annulment Committee Members 
The composition of ICSID annulment committees is almost entirely beyond the control of the 
parties to the dispute as well as the member states of ICSID, falling exclusively within the 
authority of the Chairman of ICSID.  Article 52 of the ICSID Convention outlines the 
procedure by which members of the annulment committee are selected.  On receipt of the 
application for annulment from one of the parties, the Chairman shall appoint from the roster 
of Arbitrators an ad hoc committee of three persons.  The only guidance with respect to this 
selection process other than the fact that annulment committee members must be on the Panel 
of Arbitrators (and not the Panel of Conciliators)  is that none of the members of the 
committee may be members of the Tribunal which rendered the initial award, nor may they 
be nationals of either the relevant state party or of the state whose national is a party to that 
dispute, nor may he or she have been designated to the Panel of Arbitrators by either of those 
states, or have acted as a conciliator in the same dispute.8  As a consequence, the Chairman 
has several hundred candidates to choose from.  Presumably given that being a full time 
ICSID arbitrator is not a full time position, the decision of whom to select may be dependent 
upon availability and possibly expertise, although this is unknown. Other than these 
considerations the Chairman’s decision appears to be purely random. 
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3.2   The Chairman’s Designations to the Panel of Arbitrators 
A second layer of authority is vested in the ICSID Chairman with respect to the identity of 
annulment committee members at the arbitrator panel appointment stage.  ICSID members 
may designate people to the roster Arbitrators and Conciliators from which the Chairman 
may choose annulment committee Members.  Still, the Chairman himself (or herself) may 
also appoint individuals from which this selection may be made, without any consultation 
with individual member governments.  Under Article 13(2) of the ICSID Convention, the 
Chairman may designate ten persons to each of the two Panels (Arbitrators and Conciliators).  
Each person must have a different nationality.   Article 14 (1) specifies that persons appointed 
to be Panellists should be: “persons of high moral character and recognized competence in 
the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon to exercise 
independent judgment.”  It further provides that “competence in the field of law shall be of 
particular importance in the case of persons appointed to the Panel of Arbitrators” as distinct 
from the Panel of Conciliators.   Article 15(1) states that Panel members shall serve for 
renewable periods of six years, with the number of renewable periods unspecified.  
Subsection 2 of Article 14 adds that when the Chairman designates individuals to serve on 
the Panels (meaning the roster of Arbitrators and the roster of Conciliators), he or she should 
“pay due regard to the importance of assuring representation ... of the principal legal systems 
of the world and of the main forms of economic activity.” Exercising this authority above, in 
September 2011, the then President of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, announced the most 
recent list of designations to ICSID’s Panel of Arbitrators and Panel of Conciliators.  The ten 
appointees to the Panel of Arbitrators consisted of individuals from China, Colombia, France, 
Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand/Canada, Nigeria, Pakistan, Switzerland and the United 
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States.9  This list appears to be balanced in terms of linkages with the principal legal systems 
of the world.  But again, there is no indication as to precisely how these designations were 
made by the Chairman and what criteria were used.   
 
3.3   Challenge and Disqualification of Annulment Committee Members 
Some party discretion is retained with respect to the composition of the annulment committee 
through the challenge and disqualification procedures available under ICSID rules.   It is 
widely recognized that the ability of one party to challenge an arbitrator appointed by their 
opponents (or by a third party) is crucial to the credibility of international arbitration.10 The 
ICSID Convention states that a party may challenge an arbitrator “on account of any fact 
indicating a manifest lack of qualities required by” the Convention.11 Tribunals have 
indicated that this determination is an objective one based on a reasonable evaluation of the 
evidence by a third party.12  The reference to a “manifest lack of qualities” is seen as an 
unusually high standard in international arbitration – it is comparatively difficult to disqualify 
an arbitrator under the ICSID regime.13  On a literal reading of the text of the Convention, it 
appears that the disqualification procedure outlined in Article 57 of the Convention does not 
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apply to the selection of annulment committees.  Indeed this article refers only to members of 
a “Commission” (of conciliators) or “Tribunal” (of arbitrators) and not to a committee.  
Drawing attention to this seeming gap in the text of the Convention, the annulment 
committee in Vivendi v Argentina14 decided that the same standards and procedure applies for 
determining challenges to annulment committee members as for ICSID tribunal members; 
namely that the remaining two members of the relevant committee rule on the challenge 
application.  This decision was based upon Rule 53 of the Rules of Procedure, which states 
that provisions of the rules should apply equally to procedures involving annulment 
committees.15  The Committee inferred that the Arbitration Rules were to be applied to 
annulment committee proceedings, as long as this was not inconsistent with the object and 
purpose of the ICSID Convention.16 This determination was an important development in 
ICSID arbitration practice, placing a helpful additional layer of scrutiny over the composition 
of annulment committees.  Still, the disqualification procedure empowers (to a limited 
degree) only the parties to the dispute, not the signatory states of the ICSID Convention, 
which as noted above, have only a marginal role in the establishment of annulment 
committees, through their appointment of arbitrators to the Panels. 
Thus as specified above, subject to fairly limited rules, ICSID annulment committees 
are chosen by the Chairman without any real input from the parties to the dispute or the 
member countries of ICSID.  While there is a very wide range of arbitrators in the Panel from 
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which to choose – at least several hundred – the committees are constituted at the sole behest 
of the Chairman who’s decision-making in that regard is subject to no oversight by the 
institution of ICSID itself, other than the potential for disqualification.  The highly 
discretionary, random nature of the annulment appointment procedure must be considered in 
light of the more substantive accusations that have been levied against the way in which the 
annulment procedure has been approached by committees noted briefly above.  Generally 
speaking it has been suggested that committees have shown a tendency to engage in “judicial 
activism” in reviewing awards on their merits.17 This charge is troubling given the fact that 
more than a third of all awards being fully or partially annulled with roughly 8 per cent fully 
annulled.18 Although some commentators are not persuaded by the suggestion that ICSID 
annulment committees feel that “they have a responsibility to the ICSID system as a whole 
and in the absence of a true appellate mechanism they should ensure doctrinal coherence and 
integrity,”19 others have observed a trend of “judicialization” within the annulment procedure 
in which committees have expanded the scope of their mandate to engage in substantive 
review of awards with a view to affecting the behaviour of parties prospectively.20 Some have 
seen this movement as a positive development in as much as it is seen as a step towards 
greater legitimacy in the ICSID process, seen as highly public in nature in as much as it 
affects the rights of citizens at large, by contributing to the development of general standards 
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of acceptable and unacceptable treatment by states towards international investors.21  
Whether this may be accurate, clearly a greater degree of consistency is required in the 
annulment process.  As such, the composition of annulments committees is so critical 
precisely because the role of the annulment committees as an institution within the ICSID 
system is in danger of straying beyond its designated mandate.  Whether or not the 
enlargement of the annulment committees’ powers is to continue, possibly by formally 
modifying the ICSID treaty, or whether this process should be restrained in favour of a more 
traditional approach in keeping with the tribunal’s original stated mandate, the integrity of the 
annulment process could be improved by reframing the methodology of the committees’ 
composition.  Thus substantive improvements to the annulment procedure’s mandate – 
keeping within the bounds of its discretion to assess the correctness of the procedure adopted 
by tribunals in rendering an award – could be achieved by ensuring greater ICSID member 
participation in the appointment of the annulment committees. 
 
 
4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE ANNULMENT COMMITTEE 
APPOINTMENT PROCEDURE 
As illustrated above, the Chairman has several hundred candidates to choose from when 
making annulment committee appointments.  Yet there is no official guidance on how such 
decisions are made, what criteria the Chairman uses to evaluate candidates and if external 
advice as sought or used in this process.  Simply put there is no indication that annulment 
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committee selection is done in a purposeful manner whatsoever.  While there may be a value 
choosing candidates purely at random, inasmuch as this connotes and a lack of bias at a 
superficial level, there is a critical lack of recognition of input from ICSID member states. 
The somewhat autocratic role of the Chairman in the annulment appointments process must 
be considered in light of the controversy that often surrounds the appointment of the 
President of the World Bank (the ex officio Chairman of ICSID).  This position has tended to 
be held by an American, reflecting the US’s decision-making dominance in the institution’s 
system of weighted voting, much to the consternation of commentators from the developing 
world in particular.22  This seeming bias is more alarming given the developmental focus of 
the World Bank as well as the increasing economic importance, and financial contribution, of 
large emerging markets like China, India and Brazil.  At one point there had been suggestions 
among ICSID members that the Chairman of ICSID should not be the same person as the 
President of the World Bank, but this proposal was rejected.23 
Given the importance of the annulment procedure, it makes sense in terms of fairness, 
consistency and the overall legitimacy of the ICSID system for the annulment procedure to 
focus on delivering its mandate as a reviewer of award process.  Clearly clarifications with 
respect to the substance of annulment, which have been advocated by others and which are 
not the subject of this article, could improve the integrity of this process.  More importantly, 
the ICSID annulment process can be improved by re-examining the way in which committee 
members are appointed, in particular by removing the almost unilateral discretion of the 
Chairman in this regard.  Installing greater transparency and member participation into the 
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composition of the committees by reducing the Chairman’s role will help ensure that 
committees fulfil their role as investigators of legitimacy of awards properly both in reality 
and in perception.   
 Mindful of this need for reform, useful lessons may be learned with regards to the 
appointment of ICSID annulment committee members by the procedures adopted by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO)’s dispute settlement system.   Under the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system, the WTO Secretariat proposes nominations to the dispute settlement 
panels.  These nominations should not be opposed except for compelling reasons.24 It is 
believed, however, that parties frequently reject proposed panellists with little justification.25  
As such, the panel process in WTO dispute settlement is somewhat similar to that of the 
selection of arbitrators under ICSID’s arbitration procedures.  The WTO’s Appellate Body, 
which hears appeals from reports of the panels, is appointed exclusively at the behest of the 
institution itself without any influence of the parties.  It is a standing, meaning permanent, 
international tribunal and is composed of seven persons of exceptional expertise who serve 
terms of four years which can be renewed once.26  Decisions regarding the appointment of 
particular individuals to the WTO Appellate Body are made by a committee within the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (which itself represents the all of the Member states of the 
WTO) and not by a single individual, such as the WTO Director General, who may be 
regarded loosely as the WTO’s institutional equivalent to the World Bank President.  The 
decision of WTO Appellate Body member appointment is taken on the recommendation of a 
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Selection Committee, composed of various representatives from WTO committees, as well as 
the WTO Director General.27 As with ICSID arbitrators, both WTO panels and Appellate 
Body Members must be independent and unbiased.28 This process is evidently more 
transparent and participatory than that of the annulment committee appointment procedure at 
ICSID.  This is because it involves the cooperation of many largely democratically appointed 
organs within the WTO institution, rather than the essentially opaque procedure at the 
individual discretion of one person that characterizes the ICSID annulment system.  While it 
is true that the WTO Appellate Body wields more power than that of the ICSID annulment 
committees because the Appellate Body hears appeals on points of law and has the power to 
uphold, modify or reverse panel decisions, as suggested above the annulment committee’s 
capacity to extinguish tribunal awards for procedural errors must not be taken lightly in terms 
of its overall role in the functionality of the ICSID dispute settlement system. 
 The obvious mechanism within ICSID to complement the role of the Chairman in 
annulment committee appointments is the Administrative Council.  The Administrative 
Council is the governing body of ICSID and is comprised of one representative of each of the 
member states of ICSID, which each member having one vote.  Among the various functions 
of the Administrative Council are the election of the Secretary General, the adoption of 
regulations for the conduct of ICSID proceedings and the adoption of the organization’s 
annual budget. The democratic nature of the decision-making procedure of this body is 
ideally suited to the appointment of annulment committee members, or at least, some form of 
vetting of such members as proposed by the Chairman.  It may be possible to establish a 
                                                             
27
 Dispute Set tlement Understanding Art 2.4 
28
 Rules of Conduct  for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set t lement  of Disputes, 
[II(1)], WT/ DSB/RC/ 1, 11 December 1996 
14 
 
committee within the Administrative Council for this purpose, possibly composed of member 
representatives serving temporary terms.  The process could be further improved if a separate 
list of individuals suitable for annulment committees were maintained from which selections 
could be made.  If a distinct body of people with familiarity with the annulment process were 
to be established, it would help ensure that these committees adhered to their narrow review 
function.  It may be possible to assure their availability by offering them some institutional 
compensation from ICSID, akin to a part time position. Whatever the specific format of 
decision-making undertaken with respect to appointments, this kind of system would allow 
each member state of ICSID some measure of control over the annulment process and it 
would help ensure that the process remained focused on its intended mandate of procedural 
review.   
In order to effect these changes to the ICSID Convention (enlarging the powers of the 
Administrative Council at the expense of the Chairman), the Convention itself would need to 
be amended.  Of course it is not easy to amend a multilateral convention, however modifying 
the method by which annulment committee members are appointed should be significantly 
less problematic than establishing new grounds of annulment, or even more fundamentally, 
creating a substantive ICSID appellate tribunal, as many have considered.29 Modifying the 
appointment procedure should be seen as a relatively minor adjustment in ICSID 
administrative procedure, especially in light of the significant advantages it could entail in 
terms of the dispute settlement system’s overall effectiveness and validity.  Moreover, while 
there may be some additional associated costs with a collective decision-making process, it 
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would be exceeded by the benefits in terms of legitimacy and transparency enjoyed by the 
ICSID system in its entirety.   
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Broad debates about the role of international law in augmenting foreign direct investment 
while safeguarding the interests of civil society may bring greater scrutiny upon the processes 
that underlie investment dispute settlement through international arbitration tribunals like 
ICSID.  The crucial role of the annulment committees in this regard should not be 
overlooked.30  This article has suggested that the process by which ICSID annulment 
committees are appointed should be revisited, with greater oversight by the state parties to the 
ICSID Convention adding a layer of predictability and transparency.  The procedures adopted 
by the WTO with respect to the appointment of Appellate Body members may be instructive 
in this regard.  In particular it may be worthwhile to consider having the ICSID 
Administrative Council or a committee within ICSID it to make annulment committee 
appointments, possibly drawn from a smaller pool of individuals with special expertise in 
annulment.  This would be preferable than the current system in which this process falls 
exclusively into the hands of the ICSID Chairman with fairly narrow guidance and without 
any participation from the parties, other than the limited disqualification procedure.  
Clarifying and democratizing the annulment procedure in this manner would help ensure that 
this procedure adheres to its stated function – the assessment of the correctness of the process 
of awards rendered by tribunals, lending greater legitimacy and coherence to the annulment 
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procedure, limited as it is.  If such, relatively modest modifications were possible and were 
ultimately viewed as successful by the international arbitration community and the 
membership of ICSID, procedural reform to the ICSID arbitration procedure could pave the 
way for a the re-assessment of more substantial changes to the dispute settlement institution 
in order to achieve greater coherence within the highly disparate field of international 
investment law, such as the instigation of a comprehensive appeals mechanism.  For the time 
being, the fairly simple reforms to the annulment committee appointment procedures alluded 
to here should help ensure that this feature of ICSID arbitration stays focused on its mandate 
while improving the perception of inclusiveness and state control in the vital institution’s 
dispute settlement regime. 
 
